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Introduction
The stru c t u re of the U.S. Constitution reflects a profound respect for the principles of feder-
alism and state sove re i g n t y.  These principles re q u i re the federal government to re c o g n i ze and
encourage opportunities for state and local governments to exe rcise their authority, especially
in areas of traditional state concern such as the protection of the health, safety, and we l f a re of
their citizens.  Howe ve r, over the last six years there has been a coordinated Exe c u t i ve Br a n c h
e f f o rt to use the re g u l a t o ry process to shield certain product manufacturers from state tort lia-
b i l i t y.  The Food and Drug Administration, National Highway Traffic Safety Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
and Consumer Product Safety Commission, among others, have attempted to use the doc-
trine of preemption to block consumers’ access to state courts.  During the Bu s h
Administration, exe c u t i ve agencies have included assertions of preemption in re g u l a t o ry pre-
ambles, filed amicus briefs in litigation in which other litigants have argued that federal
statutes preempt state law, and submitted to Congress draft legislation that would pre e m p t
state and local authority to protect public health, safety, and the enviro n m e n t .
The Obama administration should replace Executive Order 13132, which instructs adminis-
trative agencies to consider the federalism implications of their actions, with an Executive
Order that is more protective of the legitimate interests of state governments in maintaining
their traditional role in protecting the health, safety and welfare of their citizens.  While the
current order has some desirable features, it is inadequate to prompt the type of deliberations
in which agencies should engage when they are considering whether to support the preemp-
tion of state law.
Replace the Existing Executive Order
The basic structure of the existing Executive Order is sound in some ways.  It focuses first
on defining the President’s “Fundamental Federalism Principles” and it then lists a series of
regulatory procedures designed to ensure that agencies carry out their duties in accordance
with those principles.  Nevertheless, the current order fails to recognize or endorse basic
principles of federalism that the agencies should respect, and its procedural safeguards also
need reform.  President Obama should create a new Federalism Executive Order that
embodies these changes.
Fundamental Federalism Principles
One of the strengths of the current Executive Order is that it clearly defines many crucial
federalism principles.  But the principles enunciated in the Order are incomplete.  For
instance, the first two paragraphs of the “Fundamental Federalism Principles” section of the
Order emphasize the Constitution’s limits on federal power and the belief that issues lacking
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Recommendations for a New Federalism Executive Order
The Executive
Order should
begin with the
idea that all
types of
government
can play a
positive role in
our lives, not
with the idea
that one
source of law
is inherently
better than
another.
national scope should be “addressed by the level of government closest to the people.”
While these ideas are generally sound, it would be better to start with the idea that the feder-
al and state governments play a cooperative role in setting public policy and that each
branch or level of government (i.e., each source of law) has strengths and weaknesses that
complement the others.  The Executive Order should begin with the idea that all types of
government can play a positive role in our lives, not with the idea that one source of law is
inherently better than another in all cases.
From a pro g re s s i ve perspective, the new Exe c u t i ve Order should include the following points:
General Principles
n Federalism embodies the concept that national, state, and local sources
of law can all provide unique input to the development of optimum
public policy.
As explained above, the new Federalism Executive Order should begin with a more
positive outlook on the role of government in our lives.  The traditional concept of
federalism as a description of limits on government power is rooted in an inherently
negative view of government – the idea that government is bad and should be limited.
Instead, the Executive Order should espouse a positive view of government – a view that
all government institutions can provide useful input to public policy debates.
Federalism should be viewed as a framework for ordering the interaction of the various
government institutions in a way that accounts for each institution’s strengths and
weaknesses, and in a way that will encourage coordinated decisionmaking.
Preemption Principles
n Agencies should limit their attempts to preempt state law under
theories of implied preemption.
During the Bush Administration’s era of expanding regulatory preemption, agencies
have overlooked an important issue:  What statutory authority can they claim as the
basis for their assumed power to define the scope of regulatory preemption?  Only in
limited circumstances has Congress expressly granted an agency the authority to define
the scope of its preemptive power. Their authority to make those determinations is less
apparent when agencies use theories of implied preemption to justify their efforts to
preempt state law. The Executive Order’s “Principles” section should emphasize the idea
that statutes that might impliedly preempt state law do not grant agencies the power to
define the scope of that preemptive power.
n Agencies should adopt a presumption against “ceiling preemption.”
The term “ceiling preemption” refers to any instance where federal law invalidates states’
attempts to create or enforce more stringent or more protective regulation.   In some
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limited circumstances, Congress has created a statutory scheme that relies on ceiling
preemption.  For instance, the 2005 Energy Act changed the way decisions are made
about the siting of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.  The Act placed the decisions
solely in the hands of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, eliminating the
traditional role of local governments in the decisionmaking process.  Absent such
explicit directions from Congress, however, agencies should adopt and follow a strong
presumption against ceiling preemption.
The Executive Order should mandate that agencies adopt this theory of preemption
because it ensures that all levels of government have a role in important public policy
debates.  Unless Congress has unequivocally decided to displace certain government
institutions, the President should encourage broad inter-governmental interaction
through the enforcement of a presumption against ceiling preemption.  That
presumption should be strong in cases in which the federal government seeks to
preempt state law that regulates activities traditionally addressed under the states’ police
powers (e.g., public health and safety or land use).  The presumption against federal
preemption of state tort law should be especially strong when the federal statute does
not provide its own vehicle for compensating injured individuals, as is the case with
most of the existing environmental, health, and public safety statutes.
n Different concerns arise when considering preemption of state positive
law versus common law.
The current Executive Order fails to differentiate between state common law and state
positive law.  State positive law, such as statutes and regulations, is developed and
enforced in ways that parallel federal statutes and regulation.  State tort law, on the
other hand, relies on institutional structures and decisionmakers that are entirely
different from those found in the federal regulatory system.  State legislatures, regulatory
agencies, and common law courts have different institutional strengths and weaknesses
that could – depending on the situation – either complement or complicate federal
agencies’ work.
n The administration supports the principles embodied in the idea of
corrective justice, and the right of states to define those principles as
they see fit.
The current Executive Order emphasizes the freedom of “[t]he people of the States” to
“define the moral, political, and legal character of their lives.”  The Obama
Administration should build on this language by adding a statement supporting a
vibrant tort system.  That statement should highlight the state tort system’s capacity to
provide corrective justice, as well as its embodiment of the principle of state sovereignty.
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Regulatory Processes to Protect Federalism Principles
Agencies should be held accountable for compliance with the Order’s Fundamental
Federalism Principles.  The existing Order relies on the White House Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to monitor agencies’ compliance with its principles.  One reason for
replacing Executive Order 13132 is to adopt a more effective method of White House super-
vision of agency compliance with its fundamental principles.  A new Federalism Executive
Order should first stress the view that a generally phrased statute should not be understood
to give an agency the authority to preempt state law.  Second, the Order should define pro-
cedures that ensure compliance with its principles in the limited cases where Congress has
granted the agency the authority to preempt.
President Obama might ensure compliance with the Fundamental Federalism Principles in
the new Federalism Executive Order using a number of different procedural mechanisms.
But regardless of which system President Obama chooses, the Executive Order’s procedural
requirements should ensure that agencies implement the principles of federalism that are
described above.  The following procedures are necessary to ensure this outcome.  
Enforcing the presumption against ceiling preemption and the
presumption against agency preemption
New pro c e d u res should re q u i re agencies to publish a written justification when deciding to
p reempt state law despite the presumption against ceiling preemption.  The justification
would have to include at least two elements.  First, it should include a legal analysis of the
p re e m p t i ve effect of the governing statute.  That analysis must prove first that Congre s s
intended to grant the agency the power to define the scope of re g u l a t o ry preemption, and
second that Congress intended to preempt conflicting state or local law.  The second element
of any agency written justification should be factual evidence and policy rationale that
s u p p o rts the agency’s decision to preempt state or local law.  The supporting evidence should
demonstrate that the state or local law in question does in fact conflict with federal law.
Protecting state authority to regulate
A number of statutes that give federal agencies the power to write uniform federal
regulations also give them a coordinate power to grant waivers that enable individual states
to create their own, more stringent regulations.  The existing Executive Order instructs
agencies to review state waiver applications “with a general view toward increasing
opportunities for utilizing flexible policy approaches at that State or local level.”  The new
Executive Order can further that objective by adding limited procedural requirements.
Agencies should be required to publish a justification for any denial of a state request to
regulate in a manner more protective of public health, safety, or the environment.  As with
the written justification requirements for enforcing the presumptions against ceiling and
agency preemption, that justification should have sound legal, policy, and factual evidence to
support the agency’s decision.
Limiting Federal Agency Preemption
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Ensuring meaningful consultation with state and local officials, and
their nonprofit advocacy groups
The new Executive Order should expand on the existing Order’s consultation rules.  When
an agency plans to preempt state law, it should provide state and local officials adequate
opportunity to review the proposal at an early stage in the rulemaking process, as well as a
chance to meet with agency staff and management.  The agency should also be required to
publish a detailed account of the consultation that took place, with a summary of the state
and local officials’ concerns and the agency’s detailed responses to those concerns.  The
consultation process should also engage nonprofit advocacy groups that represent state and
local officials.  Groups that should be included are:  the National Association of Attorneys
General, National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures,
Council of State Governments, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National Association of Counties, and the International City/County Management
Association.  In recent years, some regulatory agencies have complained that their notices to
state and local officials about new preemptive regulations did not produce a response.
Actively engaging the nonprofit advocacy organizations might be more fruitful.
The proper regulatory mechanism
There are several models that President Obama could use for the new Executive Order’s
procedural requirements.  If OMB continues to review regulations on a rule-by-rule basis, it
should include a careful look at preemption in accordance with this Executive Order.
Otherwise, President Obama should adopt a policy modeled on OMB’s role in
implementing the Data Quality Act.  Some details on how these ideas could be
implemented, as well as two variations on those approaches, follow:
Rule-by-rule review: If the new administration decides to continue the existing sys-
tem of OMB review of agency regulations under Executive Order 12866, that system
could be used to review individual agency proposals to preempt state law.  In contrast to
the existing Order’s requirements, OMB would not simply rely on agencies’ attestations
that they have abided by the Order’s principles.  Instead, agencies would be asked to
articulate clearly their findings with respect to the Executive Order’s Fundamental
Federalism Principles, and OMB would carefully review those findings.  
Under Executive Order 12866, OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) is responsible for reviewing individual rules.  President Obama could use the
new Federalism Executive Order to establish an office within OIRA that would have the
legal expertise to review agencies’ compliance with the Order.  Or, he could choose a
different agency to perform the oversight function.  The Department of Justice’s inher-
ent legal expertise might make it a good agency to review regulatory preemption
decisions.  But regulatory review is not a traditional responsibility for DOJ, and DOJ
does not have the budget or infrastructure to review agency rules the way OMB does.
Recommendations for a New Federalism Executive Order
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Even so, President Obama might consider involving DOJ on a limited basis, say, by
requiring agencies or OMB/OIRA to consult with DOJ any time a proposed rule will
preempt state law.
A DQA-style approach: Under the Data Quality Act, OMB published detailed
guidance on how agencies are to implement the law.  Agencies were required to develop
their own internal policies that were in turn approved by OMB.  A revised Federalism
Executive Order might follow that model, requiring OMB to develop minimum proce-
dural requirements that will ensure agencies are considering fully the federalism
implications of their actions and findings.  The guidance should also ensure that agen-
cies are actively engaging representatives of state interests in their decisionmaking
process.  As is the case under the DQA, each federal agency would be required to devel-
op agency-specific guidelines that comport with the OMB guidance, and OMB would
have to certify that the agency’s guidelines are adequate.  For each rule completed after
OMB has approved the agency’s guidelines, the agency would simply have to certify in
writing that it has followed the approved guidelines in developing the rule.  This
approach is very similar to the requirements of Executive Order 13132 in its current
form, but it would require more detailed guidance from OMB at the outset.
A hybrid system: A third option would be to combine the DQA-style approach
with the rule-by-rule review process.  In this scheme, OMB would first develop a gov-
ernment-wide guidance document that outlines some basic procedures agencies should
adopt and questions they should answer in reviewing the federalism implications of
their actions.  Then, agencies would be required to develop their own guidelines that
match the OMB guidance, have them approved by OMB, and compile a document
describing their compliance with the procedures and answers to the questions for each
action reviewed by OMB.  OMB would be responsible for both ensuring that agencies
have complied with their guidance for each reviewable rule and reviewing the substance
of the decisions.  Again, OMB is not necessarily the best institution to have centralized
review power under this option.
Regulations, not guidelines: The last scheme the new President might adopt is
one in which the revised Executive Order prompts agency adoption of regulations that
dictate procedures for assessing the federalism impacts of agency actions.  This scheme
might be modeled on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), under which the
White House’s Council on Environmental Quality crafted government-wide regulations
for implementing NEPA and each agency has come up with its own, more detailed ver-
sion of the regulations.
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A Review of the Bush Record
The procedural safeguards proposed above will be a useful tool going forward – providing
the Obama administration a way to effectuate a new policy on preemption in future regula-
tions.  But they do not address the myriad regulations in which the Bush Administration has
argued for regulatory preemption.  The new Executive Order should include a “look back”
provision that assigns some office – be it within OMB, DOJ, or some other appropriate
agency – the task of reviewing all Bush-era claims of regulatory preemption.  The review
should focus on whether those claims square with the new Executive Order’s essential princi-
ples of limited agency preemption.  For any instance where an agency has assumed a power
to preempt state law without express statutory authority or without sufficient evidence of a
direct conflict between state law and federal regulation, the reviewers should recommend a
course of action for rescinding the preemptive decision.
Conclusion
This fall, the Wall Street Journal suggested that the multiyear effort to shield product manu-
facturers from liability through regulatory preemption might be one of the Bush
Administration’s lasting legacies.  President Obama has the opportunity, through revisions to
the Federalism Executive Order, to re-establish an appreciation for the principles of federal-
ism, state sovereignty, and the importance of a vibrant state tort system in protecting public
health and safety.
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